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1 INTRODUCTION 
at least 843 municipalities are facing financial difficulties and many of these 
are in danger of total collapse . I 
Eight [ocal authorities In South Africa owe the Department of Land Affairs about 
R205 million and most of this money is unlikely to be recovered.
2 
... many councils were also defaulting on payments to creditors. 
These quotes are from but a few of the numerous media reports over the 
last few years reflecting the sad state of local government finances in South 
Africa. In February 2000 the Bronkhorstspruit [Own council was reported as 
being unable (0 meet its financial commitments and as having made "insuf~ 
ficient provisions for looming bad debts".~ In November 1999 the Johan~ 
nesburg Metropolitan Council indicated that It would sell its metropolitan 
centre to an investment company and then rent it back in a desperate 
attempt to generate urgently needed cash. Despite this cash injection, the 
council still needed another R 100 million loan and was hoping to 'rollover' 
an existing R200 million loan that was due at the end of that year.
r
, 
In the Government's Policy Framework for Municipal Borrowing and In-
tervention published in July 2000, the Situation was summarised by the 
rather bland statement that "fiscal crisis in local government is not new in 
South Africa".~ 
I hrrp:llwww.lilfriGu:urll/business/sa/s[oryOI _tuml i-lu:esscd on 14 Ocrober 1999. 
2 As srated by the Auditor-General in his report for [he year ending March 1999, which 
concluded that therc is i-l "strong possibility" (hi-lt [his Illoney would hi-lve [0 be written 
off. Sec h(tp:llwww.busincss.ial"rica_curn/news/sabuslnessnews/14602.htm accessed on 
29 March 2000. See ,]Iso http://www_bday.co_7.a/00/0329/news/news5.htm accessed on 
29 March 2000 and http://www.mg.co.za/mg/ncws!99Aug2/26aug-local html accessed 
on 26 August 1999 
3 St<l(elllt:1lI by Daniel Manyinrlo, Senior AdvIsor in the Departrnem of Provincial and 
l.ocal Government, qumed by Wyndhillll Hartley ill /-lusinrss Day, S March 2003. 
4 hup.l!www.iafrica_colll/bllsiness!sa/rnofl.uHlIt~nl.htmaccessedon29rellruary2000.At 
Ihis lillie Ihe council was reported to have loalls ot FU42.8 million. 
5 iHlp.llwww.business iafrlca_cofl\!news!sabusinessncws! accessed all I Novcmber 19YY 










































LAW, DHMOCRACY &. [)EVELOPMENT 
A number of reasons have been advanced for this crisis, ranging from 
inadequate revenue bases and a failure to collect revenue to financial 
mismanagement, all resulting in the non~payment of salaries. pension and 
medical aid benefits, creditors, etc.' Whenever such cash~flow problems 
are experienced, municipalities may be tempted to either borrow more 
money, or roll-over existing loans - a solution that will at most provide 
short-term relief, and will probably exacerbate their long-term financial 
woes. Furthermore, the availability of debt is decreasing in concurrence 
with creditor confidence. B The need for financial reform and effective 
financial management at local government level is therefore evident. 
This article focuses on the regulation of municipal borrowing powers 
and financial emergency as part of effective local government financing. 
2 HISTORICAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Before 1993 and the enactment of the Interim Constitution of 1993, local 
authorities were regulated in the main by the respective ordinances of the 
former four provinces, Transvaal, Natal, the Orange Free State and the 
Cape Province. These provincial ordinances all granted local governments 
borrowing powers subject to different quantitative and procedural limita~ 
tions. The limitations included stipulations on the purposes for which 
loans could be obtained, ceilings on the maximum amounts that could be 
borrowed and the approval of loans by the relevant Provincial Administra-
tor. In general, these ordinances focused on pre-borrowing regulation and 
did not provide for default mechanisms other than the possible personal 
liability of counCillors." They remained in force for three years after 1993 
as neither the Interim Constitution of 1993, nor the Local Government 
Transition Act 209 of the same year (LGTA 1993), provided in any detail 
for the financial regulation of local government or contained provisions 
dealing with borrowing powers. 
This position only changed in November of 1996 with the enactment of 
the Local Government Transition Second Amendment Act 97 of 1996 
(LGTSA 1996). This incorporated Part VIA into the principal Act, which 
included a section on financial matters. 
3 CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Local government fmancial management is still governed by the LGTA 
until the new Municipal Finance Management Bill comes into operation in 
2004. Section lOG in particular provides for local government borrowing 
powers. 
In terms of section IOG(8)(a)(i). a muniCipality may raise loans for capi-
tal expenditure by way of a majority resolution of all members of the 
7 See "Presentation by Portt"olio Corllminee on JllS[[Ce and Constitutional Developmelll·'. 
5 September 2002, ilttp:llwww.prng.org.za/docsI2002 and Hartley 2003 
t! ilttp:lllatrica.comlbusinesslsa!slOryO I . iltrn aU . .:essed 0([ 14 October 1 ()9() 










































THE QUEST FOR FINANCIAL DISCIPLINE AT LOCAL GQVF,RNME;NT LEVEL 
council. This is subject to any reasonable conditions and criteria, including 
limitations on or the disallowance of such loans, which may be deter~ 
mined by the Minister of Finance by means of a notice in the Government 
Gazette. The only such determination until now restricts long~term bor-
rowing to loans for capital expenditure that have been budgeted for and 
approved by council. Ie 
Loans for bridging finance may be raised only in order to finance cur~ 
rent expenditure in anticipation of the receipts of revenue in that partiCU-
lar financial year, and not as a continuous and unlimited revolving credit. 
The only clear restrictions placed on the municipality's power to raise 
loans are that no loans may be raised in a foreign currency and that no 
other liabilities or risks payable in foreign currency may be incurred 
without the prior approval of, and subject to conditions set by, the Minis-
ter of Finance. 
Contrary to the Interim Constitution, the 1996 Constitution provides for 
local government borrowing powers in section 230. This is an enabling 
provision and it does not attempt to regulate municipal borrowing in any 
detail. Originally, local governments and provinces were given the power 
to raise loans for capital or current expenditure as long as it was done in 
accordance with "reasonable conditions" determ ined by national legisla-
tion, and with the added proviso [hat loans for current expenditure could 
only be raised when necessary for bridging purposes and had to be repaid 
within a year. 
Section 230 was, however, amended in 2001 to separate the regulation 
of provincial and municipal borrowing powers, A new section 230A now 
regulates municipal borrowing powers, as follows: 
(I) A Municipal Council may, in accordance WIth national legislation: 
(a) raise loans For capital or current expenditure for the municipality, but 
loans for current expenditure may be raised only when necessary for 
bridging purposes during a fiscal year; and 
(0) bind Itself and a future Council in the exercise of its legislatlve and 
executive authority to secure loans or investments for the municipality 
(:2) National legislation referred to in subsection (I) may be enacted only after 
any recommendations of the FinanCIal and Fiscal Commission have been 
considered' ' 
The purpose of the amendment was to empower local government to 
make long-term loans at a cheaper rate. This amendment raised a number 
of questions, particularly regarding the enforceability of such 'bindings' 
against future councils. 
In terms of section 230A, any further regulation of municipal borrowing 
powers is therefore placed in the hands of Parliament, which has to enact 
national legislation 1O lhat effect within a reasonable period'2 and after 
consideration of relevant recommendations of the Financial and Fiscal 
10 I)ppanmenl of Finance Regulation No 412. 
1 I (ons[iLLUion or South Africd AnlCndmenl Ac[ 31 at 2001. 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Commission. I, Until such time as this national legislation is enacted, local 
government borrowing is regulated by section lOG of the I.GTA (as 
amended). ' 
Section lOG does little more than reiterate the basic empowering provi~ 
sions of section 230A of the Constitution and it cannot be said to provide 
a system of coherent regulation of municipal borrowing. On the contrary, 
it fails to address important aspects such as default mechanisms or en-
forcement measures for municipal creditors, and it does not provide for 
any national or provincial government intervention in the event of local 
governments experiencing financial difficulties. The only form of interven~ 
tion provided for is that the MEC, whenever he or she is of the opinion 
that the finances of a municipality are "unsound", may instruct the coun~ 
ci I to take steps (Q correct the situation and may him/herself take such 
steps as are deemed necessary to restore the finances of the council to a 
sound footing. Exceeding municipal borrowing powers does nOl qualify a 
municipality's finances as being "unsound", as the definition of this term 
does not include a failure to abide by the terms of subsection (8)' which 
details the borrowing powers of a municipali[y.l~ 
This unsatisfac(Qry position is amplified by a lack of disclosure on mu~ 
nicipal finances and bad credit ratings, which are causing banks (Q be 
more and more reluctant to provide any loans to municipalities.l~ Add to 
this a political unwillingness to place struggling municipalities under a 
form of 'judicial' management,1 and a traditional belief that national 
government will 'bail out' such struggling entlties, I" and the result is that a 
large number of municipalities are experiencing financial difficulties. 
4 POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR BORROWING AND 
INTERVENTION 
The lack of coherent regulation of municipal borrowing powers, and 
particularly the lack of intervention and default mechanisms, gave rise to 
the government's "Policy Framework for Municipal Borrowing and Inter~ 
vention" (the Policy), which in turn inspired the Municipal Finance Man~ 
agement Bill (the draft MFM Bill). " 
I 3 Ss 210(2) and 230A(2). 
14 See Beukes v Krugersdorp Transitional Local Council 1996 (1) SA 4()7 W 1H~475 
15 S 10G(2)(m) LGTA 1996. S 10G(2)(m)(ii) stares that "rtle term 'unsound' Includes ally 
Failure to ci,'lirn or (0 collect income or to control expellditure or to compile and approve 
an operating budget, or to comply with subss (I), (2), (3), (4), (6) .-lnd (7," 
! 6 http://iafrica comlbusiness/sa/storyO! .hllH accessed on 14 October 1999. 
17 City rIldliager Kctso Gordtlan said in 1999 '"it the Uohatlnesburg Metropolitan) cOimcil 
was not a publIC institution, it would have veen placed tJnder curatorship several years 
ago" hup:llwww.business.iat.rica.com/news/siltJusinessnewsl accessed 011 I Novernber 
1999 
J H As confirmed by statements such .-lS (h.-lt of Jackie MandlC of [he Department ot 
Provincial and Local Government. who indicated a[ the end of 1999 tilat the govern-
ment WilS likely to step ill to i'!Vert .-l crisis in at least 250 local courlClls facing serious 
finanCial difficulties. hUp:llwww.buslness.iafrica.com/news/sablisilIf.SS llewsl accessed 
on I 7 Augus( 1999 










































TilE QUEST FOR FINANCIAL DISCIPLINE AT LOCAL GOVERNMt:NT LEVEL 
The Policy mentions four key elements that drove this process, namely: 
• the lack of coherent legislative regulation of municipal borrowing powers; 
• the stagnation of the municipal debt market; 
• a policy shift from national government guarantees to local responsi~ 
bility for debt, resulting in a need for a legal and regulatory frameworh 
that clarifies the rights and obligations of creditors and borrowers; and 
• the increasing financial difficulties experienced by local governments 
. .-'0 
In recent years. 
The Policy emphasised the need for local government to have direct 
access to investment capital and loan finance, the need to improve the 
credit ratings of local government and the importance of improved disclo~ 
sure of financial matters to potential investors, as interdependent ways of 
addressing the above problems.-'I Deputy Director-General Ismael Momo~ 
niat also emphasised that the ability of creditworthy municipalities to 
attract long-term private capital would allow national government to direct 
more resources to those municipalities that are incapable of doing SO.22 
These are not new concepts. A number of World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) documents have proposed local government market 
access as the preferred method of decentralisation of government bor~ 
rowing powers."" In relation to financial disclosure by local government, 
the Policy calls the "lack of clear and sufficient information about munici-
pal finances" an "impediment to municipallending".Jo Again, this is not a 
novel idea. [n October \999, Banking Council general manager Lincoln 
Mali stated that "a lack of information" was making it increasingly difficult 
for banks to assess the financial state of municipalities."" Various [MF and 
World Bank papers highli$ht the need for disclosure, transparency and 
better public information,'~ and this was stipulated clearly in the draft 
report leading to the Policy document,2"I Equally important is to keep in 
mind the purpose and target of such disclosure. The Policy states une~ 
quivocally: "The primary purpose of disclosing such information is to 
enable investors to make informed investment decisions and to allow the 
market to effectively allocate capital through pricing"," 
Further emphasising the important role of creditors and investors, the 
Policy also stresses the importance of default mechanisms and redress 
procedures in this endeavour. It points out that typical common law 
20 Ibid 92. 
21 IbiclIOq-112. 
22 htl p:llwww.bdi-lyco.zalbddylconlcnildireclil ,1521,920257 "6099-0,00.hlml accessed on 
'3 September 200 I. Tile PreSIdent's Courdilldling Council at its meetIng of 14 December 
2001 also emphaSised the need tor local governmcnt access to findnci(:ll lTla.rkels (see 
S[(:Yller 20(}2: 4) 
n See Ter-.'v'IinJssidn 1l)l)6 and All mad 1998. I See also Cronje J 995 and Wandrag 1997. 
24 Government Gazette No. 2142'3, 28 July 2000 P 108 
25 Illtp:l!wV';w. idfrica.colTllblisiflCSs/sd/sloryO I .hlm accessed on 14 October 1999 
26 See All mad 199H, Ter-MJrla<,sian 1996 (lnd Ter-Minassian 1997 
27 Cilas5er 1998: 28. 










































lAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
remedies that may be available to creditors in the private sector are, 
although available, not of much use to municipal creditors, Such redress 
mechanisms would include attachment of property" but municipal prop-
erty is by nature not very 'attachable". The Policy states that "municipali-
ties cannot be liquidated" ,2~ although the basis for the statement is not 
very clear. At most it seems to be linked to political considerations, and 
the need to continue the delivery of essential services - what the Policy 
calls the "distinctive nature ()f municipalities, as opposed to corporate 
entities in the private sector" ,3ct 
It is true that local government enjoys constitutional protection as a sepa-
rate sphere of government that is "distinctive, interdependent and interre-
lated".': The Constitution itself does not, however, protect government from 
contractual or delictual liability" The State Liability Act 20 of 1957 (as 
amended) provides that although claims against the 'state" will be cognis-
able in any competent court, "No execution, auachment or like process 
shall be issued against the defendant or respondent in any such action or 
proceedings or against any property of the State"."This Act does not define 
'state" but in section 4 refers specifically to liabilities of the "State or the 
national government or a provincial government or any depanment 
thereof". The specific reference to national and provincial government was 
inserted by amendment in 1993,.1·1 but the An does not contain any refer-
ence to local government. It appears" therefore" that though the State 
Liability An may protect national and provincial government from auach-
ment of property, it does not apply to municipalities and there may not be 
any legal prohibition on the liquidation of municipalities.~4 
This was also the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of Appeal." 
Political consideralions may, however, render it "untenable in most 
cases for a central government {Q allow a sub-national government (Q go 
bankrupt"" '" 
Whether for legal or political reasons" the Policy clearly prefers statutory 
intervention measures as default and redress mechanisms over the liqui-
dation of municipalities, and recommends the creation of a Municipal 
Financial EmergenCies Authority (MFEA) as a specialist and autonomous 
administrative instrument of state for this purpose. This type of mecha-
nism can also be found in countries such as the United States (financial 
control boards) and New Zealand (court-appointed receiverships), where 
these mechanisms are used as a last resorr.'7 
29 Ibid 114 and al 120: "il is not it!g<llly or pr<lCTic<llly possible to liquidate a llluniClpalilY" 
30 IbId 113. 
31 S 40 of the Conslirulion. See also Mettler 2002: 4. 
")2 S"3 of An 20 of I (J~7. 
33 Constitution Consequeruial Amendments Au 201 of 1991 
34 A view <llso expressed in discussion documents of (he Depanrnenls of Provincial and 
Local Government and the Treasury, (hltr:llwww,rrlrli<lrTIern org za,) 
35 ,"vlO1eis v P/aaslike Munisipalifeif van Ngwarhe en Vrysraat IHunislpale PenslOenj"onds case 
2~4/2002. See Mettler 200") 
36 Black pi (II 199<J 317 










































THE QUEST f:OR f:INANCJAL DISCIPUNE AT J .oeAL GOVERNMF,NT f .F.Vf-:L 
I.astly, the Policy chose not to impose municipal credit limits as these 
were found to be unnecessary. impractical to implement and in contrast 
with the decentralised nature of the Policy, 
5 MUNICIPAL FINANCE MANAGEMENT BILL: VERSION I - 2000 
The Policy recommendations were largely taken up in the draft MFM Bill 
published in July 2000,'" The essential stipulations in the draft MFM Bill 
relating to borrowing powers and default mechanisms can be summarised 
as follows: 
Chapter 5 limited short-term borrowing to bridging operating cash 
shortfalls and bridging capital requirements, on the basis of anticipated 
income streams, grants or long-term debt-in-waiting. It further provided 
that short-term debt should be paid off within a year and that no lender 
can extend credit to a municipality for the purpose of renewing or refi-
nancing such debt. This was clearly an attempt to protect the municipality 
against itself, but it then continues that if a lender willfully extended credit 
to a municipality in contravention of this stipulation, the municipality 
would not be bound by the contract in terms of which the credit had been 
extended. This creates the impression that the creditor. on the other 
hand, could still be bound by such an agreement. The reason for this 
stipulation is not clear. Typically, if a transaction contravenes a statutory 
prohibition, such a contract would be void, neither party would be bound 
to it and restitution would take place. 
Long-term borrowing was limited to funding of capital investment in 
property, plant or equipment to be used for the purpose of achieving the 
constitutional objectives of local government. Further conditions included 
that municipal debt had to be Rand denominated, approved by council 
resolution, the details of which had to be published in a newspaper be-
forehand, and the municipal manager had to submit information on the 
purpose of the loan, the total cost and repayment terms thereof to the 
council. ~G 
The draft MFM Bill clearly provided that national or provincial govern-
ment guarantees of municipal debt could only take place within the ambit 
of the Public Finance Management Act. W On the other hand, it allowed 
municipalities to provide security for loans, including undertakings to 
restrict future debt. cede categories of revenue rights, etc. Before a council 
could approve such security, it had to determine whether the asset or 
right with respect to which the security was to be given, was necessary for 
providing a minimum essential municipal service. If this was the case, it 
had to indicate the manner in which the service delivery would be pro-
tected. A determination that the asset or service was not linked to an 
essential service, would be binding upon the municipality until the se-
cured debt had been paid in full·' 
18 Covernmenr Gazl'lIf' No. 21-121, 28 July 2000 
39 CIi-lIJ~t' n 
tiO Clause 2~ 










































lAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Although municipalities were allowed, in terms of Chapter 8 of the draft 
MFM Bill, to establish, or acquire corporate entities to provide municipal 
services, they could not establish or acguire such entities solely for the 
purpose of raising or borrowing money.4. Municipalities were also allowed 
to guarantee any loan of a municipal entity under their ownership control, 
provided the loan was reflected in the municipal financial statements.·I > 
In line with the Policy's aim of improving municipal credit ratings and 
disclosure requirements, the draft MFM Bill included some preventative 
and monitoring measures, Chapter 2 assigned the job of monitoring and 
supervising municipal budgets and expenditure and general compliance 
with the draft MFM Bill to the National Treasury. These functions could 
also be delegated to individual national departments or department heads 
or a provincial treasury. In addition to this, municipal councils would have 
to publish their intention to borrow money in a public newspaper and 
invite representations from the public thereon before the debt could be 
incurred.4~ Chapter 5 also required any person involved in borrowing or 
investments on behalf of municipalities to disclose all relevant informa-
tion to the prospective creditor/investor during the lending process.4~ 
Somewhat in contradiction with the Policy's stated intention of im-
proved disclosure and "ansparency, Chapter 13 contained a blanket 
limitation of liability that simply said, "No person shall be liable in respect 
of anythtng done in good faith under this Act". As "person" was not 
defined, it is was not clear what the legislature intended, but it seemed to 
give carte blanche to anyone whose bonafides could not be disproved. 
The draft MFM Bill was aimed at establishing the Municipal Finance 
Emergency Agency (MFEA) as its intervention mechanism, but the legisla-
ture realised lhat the provisions contained therein might be deemed 
unconstitutional and thus Chapter I I was temporarily placed on hold. 
6 CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS 2001 
In 200 I, two constitutional Amendment Bills were tabled aimed at ef-
fecting the necessary constitutional changes to allow the implementation 
of some of the provisions in Chapter 5 of the draft MFM Bill, as well as the 
MFEA procedures. 
The first Constitutional Amendment Bill 68 of 2001 (the first Amend-
ment Bill) provided, inter alia, for amendments to sections 155 and 156 of 
the Constitution, while the second Constitutional Amendment Bill 78 of 
200 I (the second Amendment Bill) proposed amendments to sections 100 
and 139. 
The proposed amendments to section 100 in the second Amendment 
Bill would have given the national executive the power to intervene in a 
42 Clause 38 
43 C'lause47 
44 Clause 23. 










































TH I:: QU EST FOI-I, FI NANC:IAL DI SCI f)U N F. AT LOCAL GOVERN M ENT I.RVF.l. 
municipality that failed to fulfill an obligation in terms of national legisla-
tion or the Constitution. At the same time the provincial executive's inter· 
vention powers in terms of section 139 would have been brought in line 
with section 100. 
The second Amendment Bill also intended to amend the wording of 
section 2'30 to remove the reference to "reasonable conditions" that 
national legislation were to place on the borrowing powers of municipali-
ties and provinces, and to simply state that "the power of a province or a 
municipality to raise loans may be regulated by national legislation". 
The amendments to sections 155 and 156 in the first Amendment Bill 
would have allowed the establishment of the MfEA as an administrative 
authonty with extensive powers, including the power to appoint an ad-
ministrator to temporarily exercise control over the executive and legisla· 
tive authority of a municipality that is in a "municipal financial 
emergency", A court could declare such an emergency on application by 
any of a number of panies, including creditors, the municipal council, the 
Minister of Finance and organised labour, if one or more of the following 
conditions were found to exist: 
• there had been a default on a municipality's financial obligations to 
suppliers, em ployees or creditors; 
• there had been a default on a promise or agreement made in connec· 
tion with borrowing; 
• actual current expenditures had exceeded actual current revenues for 
three fiscal years or more; or 
• a municipality had experienced an operating deficit in the prior fiscal 
year in excess of 10% of actual operating revenues. 
The proposed introduction of the MFEA as an intervention mechanism 
was in line with the Policy's emphasis on the need for stronger default 
mechanisms for local government. The Policy found the existing interven· 
lion measures in section I '39 of the Constitution to be lacking. Section 139 
gives provincial government the power to intervene in the affairs of local 
government if the latter fails [0 fulfill an executive obligation, Although 
local government is recognised as a distlnct sphere of governmem,4b the 
basis for such interventions is to be found in section 155(6) of the Consti~ 
tution that assigns the duty of monitoring and support of local govern-
ment to the respective provincial governments. 47 According to the Policy. 
the section 139 mechanism is not enough as these interventions. where 
they have been initiated. have not resulted in municipalities being re~ 
stored to financial health, A process overseen by the Judiciary and man-
aged by a more independent agency was seen as a better option.·I~ 
Unfortunately, neither the basis upon which this independent agency 
would function nor the basis for the judicial oversight were particularly 
clear. Two of the four possible grounds for the declaration of a 'financial 
46 S 40 COI1SlilutiorL 
47 See S(cyricr. Mettler & lk Vi,>ser I qqq I I -12 for a disClls,>ion provincial interventions 










































I.AW, fJEM(XRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
emergency' referred to defaults on payments of amounts due or defaults 
on agreements providing for security for debts. However. the term 'de-
fault' was not defined, and no minimum default amounts were stipulated. 
Exactly how badly would a municipality have to 'default' before such an 
emergency could be declared? 
The draft MFM Bill as well as the first and second Amendment Bills 
elicited vehement response from various organisations involved in local 
government affairs. 
Cosatu characterised the proposed Amendment Bills as a "power grab". 
The Municipal Demarcation Board echoed these sentiments and both 
organisations expressed their concern at the level of consultations that 
preceded the Amendment Bills. 4 ., Concern was expressed at the fact that 
national government would be granted powers to intervene in an area 
that was assigned to provincial government in section 155 of the Constitu-
tion. Various organisations also expressed surprise at the fact thar the 
Constitution was being changed in order to fit in with the draft MFM Bill -
a case of the "tail wagging the dog"." In October 2001, Finance Minister 
Trevor Manuel suggested that the Amendment Bills should be put on hold 
for further consultation.:' 1 
On 21 November 200 I and 14 December 200 I respectively, the Consti, 
tution of South Africa Amendment Acr 34 of 2001 and the Constitution of 
South Africa Second Amendment Act 6 [ of 200 [ were enacted. As stated 
above, the proposed amendments to sections 155 and 156 were not 
enacted; instead, section 230 was amended to separate the regulation of 
provincial and municipal borrowing powers. Sections 100 and 139 were 
left unchanged. 
7 MUNICIPAL FINANCE MANAGEMENT BILL: VERSION II - 2002 
The Municipal Finance Management Bill was published again (with 
amendments) on 31 August 200 I and yet again (with amendments) as the 
Municipal Finance Management Bill I of 2002 (hereafter MFM Bill II) 
Some of the most prominent amendments to the original draft MfM Bill 
included a change in the wording regarding the prohibition on refinancing 
short-term debt. A creditor who extended credit to a mUnicipality in 
contravention of this clause would be protected if he/she acted In good 
faith and did not know that the loan was for the refinancing of short-term 
debt. Preferred creditors to whom security was given were not so fortu-
nate, however. They would still not be allowed to act against the object of 
their security if it had been deemed necessary for providing a minimum 
essential municipal service. 
A significant amendment to the original draft MFM Bill was the expan-
sion of municipal long-term borrowing powers. It provided that long-term 
49 llnp:llwww.bday.co.l.a/lxL·lylcorl1cnl/direcllacce .... ed on 2'1 Scpl(~rnbcr 2001 
50 Jlttp:llwww bday.co.za/bddy/conlem/direcr/ accessed un ;W September 2001 Sec also 
I k Visser & Slcy[icr 200 I -1. 










































THE QUEST FOR FINANCIAL DISCII'I.lNE AT IDCAI. COVERNMF.NT LF.VEI. 
debt could be incurred nor only for capital expendiwre, but also for refi-
nancing existing long-term debt. Capilal expendiwre was now defined (0 
include financing costs, printing costs, COStS for professional services and 
Olher costs, 
The limitation of liability clause was amended by defining 'person' (0 
include organs of stale or persons performing a function or exercising a 
power in terms of the Act. This served to at least clarify the intention of 
the legislature and it may be less open to abuse than the first version, hut 
it still seemed to contradict the need for disclosure and transparency. 
The MFEA provisions were left out of the previous versions of the draft 
MFM Bill, pending lhe constitutional amendments of seClions 155 and 
156 as envisaged by the first Amendment Bill. Despite the fact that the 
proposed amendment lO section 155 was not enacled, the MFEA provi-
sions were included in the MFM Bill II. It provided for the establishment of 
an Emergency Au[hority [Q oversee the financial recovery of municipali-
ties declared to be in a financial emergency. These provisions did not 
change much from those published on 20 July 2000; they still failed to 
define 'defaull' or stipulate minimum amounls for default thal would 
justify the declaration of a 'financial emergency', 
Despite the amendments to the original version of the Bill. the 2002 
MFM Bill II still elicited strong responses from various organisations 
involved in local government affairs. The Finance and Fiscal Commission 
declared that it would be inappropriate to apply the MFM Bill II uniformly 
lo all municipalities, weak and strong."'" The Municipal Demarcation Board 
rejected the ~\FM Bill lion the grounds that it did not take into account 
the independence of local government. calling for a Bill that would not 
"encroach on the institutional integrity of local government"." The City of 
Cape Town and [he \>\Iestern Cape Local Government Association objected 
and called for a rewrite of the MFM Bill II. which they claimed was uncon· 
stitutional and would give the National Treasury too much power to 
interfere in local government affairs.~4 The Communily Law Centre at the 
University of [he Western Cape raised a number of concerns about the 
MFM Bill II. including the fact that although sound financial administration 
is essential, it goes too far in allowing [he National Treasury [Q intrude into 
local government affairs.'· 
8 AMENDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
In response to [he various submissions received, the ConstitUlion of South 
Africa Amendment Bill 33 of 2002 (the Amendment Bill 33) was intro· 
duced. aiming at "casing the introduction" of the MFM Bill'" - a task that 
proved much more difficult than anticipated. 
52 tmp:llwww Ild..1Y Ul za/ildayl< onlenl/dircr:lf dccessed on J 4 F~bruary 2002. 
:») hnp./lwww.IH:ws24.COI1l New~24f acce5sed on 19 February 2002 See aLso 
IlllpJlwww.bl!lm.co.zalcgl-bin/pp-prinl pi accessed on 2 May 2002 
:14 Imp.llwww.bdftn,w.zafcgt-billfpp-prirll pi iKU!Sst.:d on 14 Mdr< It 2002 Se~ also [he 
CO'ial\l SUhllll'i!-,jon of 12 Marcil 2{){)2 dl IHlp Ifwww.cosatu.org.za 
55 De Visser & Steytier 2UU2: 16 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
The aim was to amend section 139 of the Constitution to provide for 
discretionary provincial intervention where a municipality: 
• cannot or does not fulfill an executive obligation in terms of legislation 
or the Constitution; 
• fails to approve or give effect to a budget; 
• does not fulfill any other obligation specified by legislation; or 
• where the serious or persistent breach of such obligation threatens the 
health and safety of residents of the municipality. 
If the provincial executive failed to fulfill this obligation, the national 
executive could intervene in accordance with section 100 of the Constitu-
tion. This differs drastically from the second Amendment Bill, which 
would have granted direct intervention powers to the national executive, 
It also differs drastically from the current pOSition, which allows provincial 
intervention only if a municipailty fails to fulfill an executive obligation. 
This drastic change was explained as an attempt to "provide a missing 
piece in the Government's overall strategy in dealing with municipal 
financial problems"." According to the Policy, the Government intended 
to provide a comprehensive approach to resolving financial crises in 
municipalities, and as financial recovery usually requires the adoption or 
modification of municipal budgets, provincial interventions would have to 
include the power to adopt or mOdify budgets in order to be successful 
Provincial interventions under the current constitutional framework lack 
that power, as budgetary decisions by municipal councils are regarded as 
legislative and not executive functions.~~ 
The Amendment Bill 33 also provided for the compulsory intervention 
by provincial government where a municipality. as a result of "a crisis in 
its financial affairs is in serious or persistent breach of its obligations to 
provide basiC services or to meet its financial commitments". Such com-
pulsory intervention could include the adoption and implementation of a 
recovery plan to resolve the municipality's financial difficulties as well as 
the dissolU[ion of the municipal council and the approval of a temporary 
budget.'· In his presentation before the Security and Constitutional Affairs 
Select Committee. Deputy Director-General Ismael Momoniat emphasised 
that this clause represents the ultimate scenario or situation of last resort 
and that governmental monitoring and oversight functions should be used 
to prevent municipalities from reaching such financial crises."j As a reason 
for the clause was It was explained that municipalities could not be al-
lowed to deliberately default on loans to creditors, for political or other 
':J7 "MimHCS of JIJslice and FilldlKC Portfolio ('nrnllliu('c~ Mcr:ling on 19 february 2(0)" 
hl! p:/ Iwww.plng.org.zA/docs/ZOO.)/ 
58 As decided in Petisllre Life Assurance Ud (ind others v Greater johannl:'stmr!J TMC Imd 
olhas 1998 (12) BCLR 141)8 ({l~) See Alsu "MilllHes of Stcnlrity dlld ConstitutlonJI AI-
tdirs Select COllllTllttee Meeting on 26 February 2003"' Iltlp:llwww.pnl~.l)rg.7.a/duc: .. 1 
200.31 dnd S!eyrler & Smith 2002: 2. 
5q fln(/. See also hnp:l/www.bdt.co.zalcgi-binlpp-prJrl1. pi ac("e~s(~d Oil I () July 2002 
60 "'Millllles of Security awl C Ollsritlj(iorl<ll Arfairs Select C:ommillce M(~ctillg on 










































THE QUEST ~OR. HNANCIAL DISCIPLINE AT LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL 
reasons, as this would adversely affect every other municipality's chances 
of obtaining loans.(' This sentiment certainly cannot be faulted and is in 
line with the stated objectives of the Policy. The same can unfortunately 
not be said of the wording of the clause, which raised a number of ques-
tions in the Justice and Constitutional Affairs Portfolio Committee dealing 
with constitutional amendments. The most obvious was the question of 
what is meant by "a crisis in its financial affairs"? The Committee, how-
ever, found the answer to be quite obvious - the financial crisis in section 
! 39( I B) was limited to a "seriolls or persistent breach of an obligation to 
deliver basic services or to meet financial commitments".~..' Exactly what 
such a 'serious breach' would entail was unfortunately not made equally 
clear. 
Lastly, the Amendment Bill 33 also provided that if provincial govern-
ment failed to fulfill its obligations of intervention the national executive 
could, in accordance with section 100, intervene by directing the province 
to act, or by assuming responsibility itself if necessary. 
During the hearings on the Amendment Bill 33, SALGA made a submis-
sion opposing the amendments on the grounds that they would under-
mine the constitutional integrity of local government. Instead, SALGA 
emphasised the monitoring and supporting role of provincial government 
in relation to local government as assigned by the Constitution, with 
intervention as a last resort. SALGA proposed a new amendment to sec-
tion 139 that would require provinces, in case of intervention, to explain 
which monitoring and supporting measures they had taken prior to the 
intervention ,_-I 
Although jt is true (hat the Constitution recognises local government as 
a separate sphere of government, with its executive and legislative 
authority vested in its municipal council, and that it has the right to gov-
ern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community, 
this right is "subject to national and provincial legislation, as provided for 
in the Cons(jtU[ion".~1 The Constitution itself therefore provides for possi-
ble limitations to the autonomy of local government, subject again to the 
proviso that "national or provincial government may not compromise or 
im pede a municipality's ability or right to exercise its powers or perform 
its functions. "n', Saving a financially inept local government which finds 
itself in a "financial crisis" from itself can hardly be called "compromising 
or impeding" its right or ability to govern itself - provided, of course, that 
such financial crisis is properly defined. 
61 lind 
62 ",V1illutes of Justice Pont"olio Cornrnirrec \l\cCling Of! ') Seplelllber 2002", 
hI rp:llwww.pnlg.org.za/docs/20021 
63 "MlnLHeS of JU!-.tice Pont"ollo Commi[[cc Mccling on 6 Seplember 2002' 
hllp.llwww,pmg.org,zafdocsf2002/_ See also Met[ler 2002 3-6 and Ensor 2U02b. 
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LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
The debate on the intervention mechanisms proposed in the Amendment 
Bill 33 continued in September:' October:' and November 2002'" before 
the Portfolio Committees on Justice and Constitutional Development, and 
Finance, but were not finalised before the Parliamentary recess. The debate 
continued into 2003.'·c Eventually lhe amendments were enacted as the 
Constitution of South Africa Second Amendment Act 3 of 2003.m 
Section 139 of the Constitution now provides for three different types of 
provincial intervention in local government affairs. 
The first type is a discretionary intervention mechanism in the event of 
a municipality failing. or being unable, to fulfil an executive obligation in 
terms of the Constitution or legislaLion. This is a general intervention that 
allows the provincial executive, inter alia, to issue a directive stating the 
steps required to meet its obligations, assuming responsibility for the 
relevant obligations in the municipality or dissolving the municipal council 
and appointing an administrator. if "exceplional circumstances" warrant 
such a step. There is no attempt to define 'exceptional circumstances' that 
would warrant the dissolution of the municipal council, but if it should 
happen, notice of such dissolution mUSt be given to the relevant Cabinet 
member and NCOP. Steytler" submits that an example of such 'excep-
tional circumstances' can be found in section 34(3) of the Municipal 
Structures Act of 1998, which empowers an MEC to dissolve a municipal 
council if an assumption of responsibillty in terms of section 139 does not 
result in the council being able to fulfill its obligations in terms of legislation. 
Section J 39 further provides for two instances of mandatory provincial 
intervention. In terms of section 139(4). the provincial executive must 
intervene if a municipality "cannot or does not fulfill an obligation in 
terms of the Constitution or legisla[ion [Q approve a budget or any reve-
nue-raising measures" relating to the budget. The provincial executive 
must take any steps necessary to ensure the approval of the budget or 
revenue-raising measures. Again. the provincial powers include the disso-
lution of the municipal council, the appointment of an administrator and 
the approval of a temporary budget. '. 
6() "MlfllHes of" joint meeting of Justice and COtlsti(lltional Development and f-illdllce 
Purtfollo Corflrtlil(e('s. 16 Septcrnbpl" 2002", tuql:!/www.prng.org.za/docs/20U2/. 
67 "Minutes ot {he Finance Porrfolio CommlUee of J6 Oerobcr 2002", 
hi tp .Ilwww.pmg.org.za/docs/2002/. 
6H "Mimul's of joirn nll'clirlg of JIIsricf' ami CorlstillltiOilal I)eveloprTIl'll{, Finance an(i Provincial 
and I.OLdl (joVt~rnrncrH Ponfolio Cornrnillees, 12 November 2002", hnp"//www.pIlIg.org.zal 
ctocs/20021 "Minutes ot" (he Financc Pont"olio Cornrnillee of 16 Oct()b(~r 2002", 
htl P ·//www.prng. 0 rg. za/docs/2 O( )21. h (t [J :lIwww . pm g. org.La/docs/20{ )21 
69 "Minllles 01' (tie Sf'CtJrilY and (ons(iUlIlonal Aflairs ~clcct CorrtITlilll'c of 26 february 
2Um", tlllp:l/www.prngorg.za/dol"s/20()1/ 
70 Govcrnmenf (j(w:lU: No. 24714, Gov N516 J I April 200, 
71 Sreytler 2U03: ~ 
72 JkTi:lIJSP of till' power (0 dissolw thc Mlmicipal COllncil in terms ot s J 3')(4), Stf'yller 
(2001: 6) also rt~gclrds (he municipality's failure (0 adopt d budget as an example 01 Ill(' 
"eXCl'plional circumstances" referred (0 in s J 19( I )(e). It" this had been (\1e case, howcwr, 
why does lhl! "cxceptional circumstancc" in s 139(4) justify a rnJWiillory inlervclliion, 
while the "exceptional circumstances" ret"erred to in s 119( I)(e) Jlw!"('ly give" 21 pOIf'rtlidl 










































'1'1 IE QUES1' FOR FINANCIAL DISCIPLINE AT LOCAl. GOVr:RNMENT I.EVr:L 
Section 139(5) retained the much-debated last-resort clause. IL provides 
for a mandalOry intervention if a municipality, as a result of "a crisis in iLS 
financial affairs, is in serious or persistent material breach of its obliga-
Lions to provide basic services or 1O meet its financial commitments, or 
admits that it is unable to meet its obligations or financial commitments". 
In the event of such financial crisis, the provincial executive must impose 
a recovery plan aimed at securing the municipality's ability to meet its 
service and financial commitments and must dissolve the municipal 
council if the municipality fails to approve legislative measures, including 
a budget. If the council is not dissolved, the provincial executive must take 
responsibility for the implementation of the recovery plan. This recovery 
plan must be prepared in accordance with national legislation and will 
bind the municipality in the exercise of its legislative and executive 
authority to the extent necessary to solve the crisis in its financial affairs. 
Section 139 still does not attempt to define a "crisis in its financial af-
fairs" or a "serious or persistent material breach" of obligations. Presuma-
bly, these aspects would be defined in the national legislation that is 
envisaged by section 139(8), which states that national legislation may 
regulate the implementation of, and the processes established by, the 
section. 
Lastly, section 139(7) prOVides that if the provincial executive fails to, or 
does not adequately exercise the mandatory intervention mechanisms, the 
national government must intervene in terms of subsections (4) and (5) 
instead. Again a number of questions are left unanswered. What would 
constitute an "inadequate" intervention by the provincial executive, and 
who is to make this determination? 
These amendments and the intervention mechanisms they provide for 
confirm the government's commitment to a "comprehensive" approach 
to financial diSCipline at local government level, its concerns regarding the 
bad cr(;dit ratings of municipalities and its desire [0 create a viable mu-
nicipal debt market. The amendments have not yet entered into force, but 
when they do, they are expected to pave the way for the enactment of the 
MuniCipal Financial Management Bill, the long-awaited national legislation 
that will regulate the implementation of the mechanisms created by 
section J 39. 
9 MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT BILL: 
FINAL VERSION - 2003 
The MFM Bill II of 2002 was also reworked in response to the various 
submissions and responses referred to in section 7 above. From October 
2002 various redrafts of the MFM Bill II were deliberated in the Finance 
Portfolio Committee," as well as in jOint meetings of the Finance and 
73 "Minutes of tile i-=indncc Ponfolio Committ('(' of 15 dnd 16 October 2002", 
llllp:llwww.pmg.org.zJlrJocs/20021 and 01 10 May 2003, 3 June 2003. 12 August 2001 










































tA.W, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Provincial and Local Government Portfolio Commitcees.
14 
Much of the 
discussion focused on municipal enticies, procurement and financial mis-
conduct. Two legal opinions were obtained regarding the constitutionality 
of certain of the clauses in the MFM Bill II'" 
AFter "three years of tortuous deliberations and redraFts"," the MFM Bill 
II was Finally adopted by the National Assembly on 11 September 2003," 
It is aimed at securing "sound and sustainable management of the Fi-
nancial affairs of municipalities and other institutions in the local sphere 
of government", Among other things, it will regulate municipal borrowing 
and the handling of Financial problems in municipalities 10 accordance 
with the intervention mechanisms created by the amendments to section 
139 of the Constitution (still to come into eFFect), 
9_1 Regulation of debt 
The regulation of municipal borrowing powers in Chapter 6 IS much more 
detailed than in the original draFts, 
"Debt" is defined in section 1 as including not only monetary liabilities, 
obligatiOns or the issuance of municipal debt instruments, but also contin-
gent liabilities, such as that created by guaranteeing the monetary liabili-
ties or obligations of others. 
Short-term debt (debt repayable within one year) may only be incurred 
when necessary to bridge shortfalls within a financial year during which 
the debt is incurred, in expectation of specific and realistic anticipated 
income to be received in that financial year, or to bridge capital needs 
within a financial year, to be repaid from enforceable allocations or long-
term debt commitments.·I~ 
Such short-term debt must further be approved by a municipal council 
resolution and the signature of the accounting officer must appear on the 
agreement. Short~[erm debt must be repaid within one financial year and 
may not be renewed or refinanced if the effect of the renewal or reFi-
nancing will extend the debt into a new financial year. 
The rather controversial section dealing with the consequences of unau-
thorised renewal of short-term debt has been substantially improved, 
Section 45(5) still provides that no lender may willfully extend credit to a 
municipality to reFinance or renew short-term debt and that if he/she does 
so willfully, the municipality is not bound to repay the loan or interest on 
the loan, This section still gives a somewhat one-sided protection to 
the municipality, but the addition of the word "willfully" does create an 
71 See "Minutes of JOint MeClings of the Finance and Provincial dnd 1.ocal Cuwrrllllenr 
Portfolio COlnminees; I:manc<: Select Committee on II. 15 and 16 Arril :W03", 
Illrr:/Iwww rmg.org.zd/docs/20011 
75 See Trengove and Cockrell 2003a and 2003b: J and 2 
76 F.n~or 2003 
77 See "Parllam~ntary Papers of I! Serlf:"lllber 2003: ArlflOllrlCernellts, tab lings <lnd 
cOfTImlttee reports", at tHlp:llwww.parlidrnem.gov.za 










































THE QUEST FOR FINANClAI~ DISCIPUNE AT IDeAL GOVERNMENr l.EvEL 
impression of a lack of bona fides on the side of the lender. This impres~ 
sion is strengthened by subsection (6) which states that this protection in 
subsection (5) will not apply when the lender acted in good faith on 
written representations of the municipality as to the purpose of the bor~ 
rowing and did not know, nor had reason to helieve, that the borrowing 
was for the purpose of renewing short-term debt. 
In terms of section 46, a muniCipality may only incur long~term debt 
(repayab[e over more than one financial year) for purposes of capital 
expenditure to be used for the purposes of achieving the objects of local 
government in section 152 of the Constitution, or for re-financing existing 
long-term debt, provided that the existing debt was incurred lawfully and 
that the debt will nOL outlast the usefulness of the capital items for which 
the money was used. Such long~term debt also requires a municipal 
council resolution, the Signature of the accounting officer and the publica-
tion of the proposed debt 14 days prior to the council meeting. 
Section 48 allows municipalities to provide security for any of its debt 
obligations or any debt obligations of a municipal emity under its sole 
control. These security provisions are quite wide and include agreeing to 
restrictions on debt that the municipality may incur in future until the 
secured debt is settled or [he secured obligations are met. 
Before such security can be gramed. the council must determine 
whether the asset or right covered by the security is necessary for pro-
viding the minimum [evel of basic municipal services, and, if so, must 
indicate how the availability of the asset or right for the provision of that 
service will he protected. As in previous drafts of the Bill. the continued 
provision of basic municipal services is protected in that once a determi~ 
nation has been made that the asset or right is necessary for providing the 
minimum level of service. neither the secured lender nor any successor 
may, in the event of default by the municipality, deal with the asset in a 
manner that would preclude or impede the continuation of the minimum 
level of basic municipal services. 
The MFM Bill as adopted also retains the basic disclosure reqUirements 
in section 49, which requires any person involved in municipal borrowing 
to disclose all relevant information that may influence the decision of the 
prospective lender or investor. 
9.2 Financial emergencies 
It is apparent that, contrary to the tenor of the first drafts of the MFM Bill, 
10 the final version adopted the emphasis has shifted from the declaration 
of financial emergencies in municipalities to measures aimed at prevent~ 
109 such emergencies, Section 135 firmly places the primary responsibil· 
ity for aVOiding, identifying and solving municipal financial problems on 
the municipality itself and requires it to notify provincial government if it 
is unable to do so. 
A mayor must report a serious financial problem or a failure to approve 
an annual budget by the first day of the financial year to the MEC in the 










































l.AW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
intervention in terms of section 139 of the Constitution.7~ Such provincial 
intervention based on the failure to approve a budget is also expressly 
provided for in section 26. 
Although this paradigm shift is to be welcomed, it seems as though 
these principles should have been understood from the inception of local 
government as a separate sphere of government and that it should not 
have been necessary for parliament to propose legislation in order to 
remind local government that it "must meet its financial commitments".~~ 
The MFM Bill, as adopted, details possible provincial interventions in 
local government, distinguishing between discretionary and mandatory 
interventions and referring directly to the corresponding provisions of the 
newly enacted section 139 of the Constitution. 
Section 136 places the responsibility on the MEC for local government 
to assess the seriousness of the situation if he/she becomes aware that 
there is a serious financial problem in a municipality. The MEC further 
carries the responsibility of determining whether the situation justifies an 
intervention in terms of section 139 of (he Constitution. 
Three types of interventions are created. directly corresponding with 
the discretionary intervention in terms of section 1 39( I) and the manda~ 
tory interventions in section 139(4) and (5) of the Constitution. The im-
plementations of the different intervention mechanisms are detailed 
respectively in sections 137,26 and 139 of the MFM Bill as adopted. 
Section 136(2), read together with sections 136(1) and 137(1) and 0), 
adds a new dimension to the discretionary intervention mechanism in 
section 139( I) of the Constitution by linktng the failure to fulfill executive 
obligations and the discretionary intervention~; to the existence of a 
"serious financial problem""' Section 137(3) states unequivocally that the 
discretionary intervention mechanism created by sections 136(2) and 
137(1) of the MFM Bill, as adopted, does not apply to a provincial inter-
vention which is unrelated to a financial problem in a municipality. This 
appears to be something of a departure from the discretionary interven~ 
tion mechanism provided for by section [.39(1) of the Constitution, which 
is not linked specifically to financial problems in the municipality. 
The discretionary intervention mechanism provided for in section 
137( I) includes a determination by the provincial executive whether the 
financial problem, singly or in combination with other problems, is suffi~ 
ciently serious or sustained that the municipality would benefit from a 
financial recovery plan. If yes, the executive has the power to request 
"any suitably qualified person" to prepare an appropriate financial recov-
ery plan for the municipality. 
This section and its deviation from section [39( [) of the Constitution, 
was one of the aspects considered by the Trengove legal opinion submitted 
79 S 55 
80 S 135(2) 
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THE QUEST FOR FINANCIAL DISCIPLINE AT LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL 
to the PortFolio Committee,~~ The question Adv. Trengove had to answer 
was whether it is constitutionally permissible for the MFM Bill to allow a 
financial recovery plan to be imposed on a municipal council dUrlng a 
discretionary intervention. He concluded that it would be permissible, as 
section 139( I) of the Constitution permits the provincial executive to take 
"any appropriate steps" to address the municipality's failure to fulfill its 
executive obligation and that the imposition of a financial recovery plan 
would qualify as such an "appropriate step". 
The criteria for determining the existence of such a "serious financial 
problem" for purposes of section 137. are set out in section 138. This section 
requires all relevant facts to be considered. and states that the factors stipu~ 
lated may, singly or in combination, indicate a serious financial problem. 
These factors include the municipality failing to make "payments as and 
when due"; defaulting on financial obligations for financial reasons; 
having its current expenditure exceeding current revenue plus available 
surpluses For at least two consecutive financial years; the existence of 
operating deficits in excess of 5% of revenue; the municipality being 
more than 60 days late in submitting annual financial statements to the 
Auditor~General; if any of these conditions exist in a municipal entity 
owned or controlled by the municipality; or any other material condition 
which indicated that the municipality. or its entity. is likely to be unable 
for financial reasons to meet its obligations. 
Unfortunately. most of these criteria are vague and would not really 
assist in determining the existence of "a serious financial problem". With 
reference to the first criteria of failure to make payments. no indication is 
given as to what kind of payments this refers to and to whom such pay-
ments should be due. Would this include all payments. notwithstanding 
the amount. to short-term as well as long-term creditors, employees, 
service providers, etc? What does "as and when due" mean? Can a serious 
financial problem be found to exist if payment to a service provider is not 
made within 30 days as requested. or would payment within 60 days 
suffice to avert a serious financial problem' It seems as though guidelines 
that are more definite would be required for the MEC to make this deter-
mination. What does "default on financial obligations for financial rea-
sons" mean' Which financial obligations should be taken into account? 
Would a default on an obligation of R I 00 be sufficient to trigger a "serious 
financial problem'" 
The reference to defaults For "Financial reasons" does not make much 
sense either. It seems to create the impression that municipalities could 
default on any financial obligations. as long as it IS not done for financial 
reasons. This appears to be a direct contradiction to the statements made 
in February 2003 by Ismael Momoniat. the Deputy Director-General in the 
National Treasury. indicating that no municipality could be allowed to 
deliberately default. as it would adversely affect all other municipalities" 
R3 Tn~ngr()w~ & Cockrell 20U3a 
84 "Minutes or Secunry on COrls!itlJ1iorlal Affairs Select Commitlee of 26 ~ebruary 200,.', 










































lAW, DEMOCKACY & DEVELOPMENT 
It also appears to contradict section 135(2). which simply states, "a mu· 
nicipality must meet its financial commitments" - without adding any 
qualifications or political exceptions, 
Secondly, it is not clear how an MEC will "become aware" of the exis· 
tence of such serious financial problems as required by section 136( I). 
There is an obligation on the mayor to repon financial problems in terms 
of section 54, and the municipality must repon financial problems to the 
MEC in terms of section 135(3), but what if the mayor or municipality fail 
to do S07 In terms of the MFEA provisions contained in the MFM Bill II of 
2002, external panies such as creditors or organised labour could apply to 
the courts to make such a determination. Section 136 seems to rely totally 
on the integrity of the mayor and municipality to repon the existence of 
serious financial problems, in so doing initiating potential discretionary 
provincial intervention. Lastly, section 137( I )(c) allows "any suitably 
qualified person" to prepare a financial recovery plan in terms of the 
discretionary intervention mechanism, Again, no guidelines are provided 
as to what would constitute "suitable qualifications". Yet, once this person 
has prepared the financial recovery plan the municipality must implement 
it in terms of section 145, and it binds the municipality in the exercise of 
its executive authority, ro the extent necessary to resolve the financial 
problems of the municipality, If the municipality cannot or does not 
implement this financial recovery plan, section 145(3) provides that the 
provincial executive CQuid take further appropriate steps in terms of 
section 139(1) or (4) of the Constitution to ensure its implementation. 
Compulsory provincial intervention is regulated by section 26, or a failure 
to approve a budget, and by sections 139 and 140, where the municipality, 
as a result of a crisis in its financial affairs, is in serious or persistent ma[e~ 
rial breach of service obligations or financial commitments, or admits that it 
is unable to meet those obligations or commitments. 
In terms of section 139, the provincial executive must, in these circum~ 
stances, promptly request the ,\1unicipal Financial Recovery Service to 
determine the reason for the financial crisis, assess the municipality'S 
finanCial state and prepare an appropriate financial recovery plan, in· 
cluding recommendations for appropriate changes to the budget and 
revenue raising measures. The Municipal Financial Recovery Service is an 
institution within the public service that forms part of, and functions 
Within, the National Treasury, Section 139(3) provides that any mandatory 
intervention in terms of section 139 supersedes any discretionary section 
137 intervention, provided that any financial recovery plan. as prepared 
by the "suitably qualified person", must continue until replaced by the 
recovery plan from the Municipal Financial Recovery Service in terms of 
section 139, 
In terms of section 140, a determination on whether the conditions for 
a mandatory section 139 intervention exists should take into account all 
factors, and any or all of these may indicate a serious material breach of 
financial commitments. 
Such factors include a failure by the municipality to make any payment 










































THE QUEST FOR FINANC1AL DISCIPLINE AT LOCAL GOVERNMEN'r LEVEL 
obligation providing security in terms of section 48; a failure to make any 
other payments as and when due, which exceeds prescribed amounts, or 
exceeds 2 % of the municipality's budgeted operating expenditure. or if 
the municipality's failure to meet its financial commitments has impacted, 
or is likely w impact, on the availability or price of credit w mher munici-
palities. In terms of section 140(3). any recurring or continuous failure by 
a municipality to meet its financial commitments, which substantially 
impairs the municipality's ability to procure goods, services or credit on 
usual commercial terms, may indicate persistent material breach of its 
financial commitments. 
Again. this attempt at defining the grounds for mandatory provincial 
intervention lacks clarity. No minimum amounts are prescribed in relation 
to a failure to make payments to lenders or investors, and again "as and 
when due" is not defined. It seems that payments to service providers, 
employees. etc are not included in this section. Such payments should 
resort under "any other payment". At least as far as "other payments" are 
concerned. a minimum amount of more than 2 % of budgeted operating 
expenditure is prescribed. Though provision is made for amounts w be 
prescribed, it is not clear by whom this should be done. It is equally 
unclear how a determination will be made on whether one municipality's 
failure to meet its financial commitments will impact upon the availability 
of credit to others. 
Section 140(4) excludes the application of all these criteria to obliga-
tions explici(ly waived by the crediwr, or disputed obligations concerning 
which there are pending legal actions between the municipality and the 
creditor. Where legal action is pending. or a waiver has been obtained 
from a creditor, the requirements for mandatory provincial intervention 
will not be met. 
Contrary to section 137. only the Municipal Financial Recovery Service 
may prepdre a financial recovery plan in terms of a section 139 manda-
tory intervention. This effectively means that the National Treasury will be 
responsible for placing a municipality back on its feet in terms of a man-
datory provincial intervention. 
The municipality must implement the financial recovery plan in (erms 
of a section 139 mandatory intervention, and it binds the municipality in 
the exercise of both its legislative and executive authority, including the 
approval of a budget, but only to the extent necessary to give effect to the 
recovery plan.~" 
Section 142 prescribes specific criteria for financial recovery plans 
which must ultimately be aimed at securing the municipality's ability to 
meet its service obligations and its financial commitments and which 
must, inter alia, provide for the liquidation of specific assets, excluding 
those needed for the provision of minimum levels of municipal services 
and which must provide for debt restructuring or debt relief. 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY Ii DEVELOPMENT 
The MFM Bill, as adopted, also contains provisions of specific signifi-
cance to the regulation of municipal borrowing powers, 
Section 151 protects any com mon law or legislative rights of creditors 
and others who have claims against municipalities, to revert to ordinary 
legal processes or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, except as 
otherwise provided in Chapter 13 itself. Although such a retention of 
rights for creditors, investors and others must be welcomed, the true 
value of this provision must also be questioned in view of the Policy's 
contention that such common law or legislative redress procedures are 
not of much use to creditors vis-a.-vis municipalities.~~ 
Section 152 appears to re-afflfm the Policy's view, at least on a tempo-
rary basis, by allowing a municipality that is "unable to meet its financial 
commitments" to apply to the High Court for a stay of all legal proceed-
ings against it or against entities under its sole ownership or control for a 
period not exceeding 90 days. Notice of such an application must be given 
to the province and creditors to whom the municipality (or entity) owes 
more than a prescribed amount, or more than R I 00 000. No indication is 
given of the grounds upon which the court should grant this application, 
neither is an "inability to meet financial commitments" defined. It is also 
not clear how this section relates to provincial intervention. Can, or 
should, a municipality apply for a stay of proceedings against it before it 
notifies the province of its financial problems? If it does, it may, in terms 
of section 152(3), be regarded as an admission of inability to meet its 
financial commitments in terms of section 139(5) of the Constitution, 
which could in turn lead to mandatory provincial intervention. Although it 
is clear that such a stay of proceedings can provide breathing space to a 
financially troubled municipality, it could be prejudicial to creditors, 
especially creditors to whom the municipality or entity owes less than 
RIOO 000. Since none of the other sections relating to defaults in pay-
ments mentions any amounts, it IS not clear why only creditors of more 
than R I 00 000 need to be informed of a section 152 application. 
A slightly more balanced provision is contained in section 153, which 
provides for appliCations for extraordinary relief. In this case, a munici-
pality may apply to the High Court for a stay of all legal proceedings 
against it for a period not exceeding 90 days at a time. an order to sus-
pend its financial obligations to creditors until it can meet those obliga-
tions, or an order to terminate its financial obligations [0 creditors and 
settle their claims in terms of a distribution scheme as referred to in 
section 155. Such a distribution scheme in terms of section 155 effectively 
amounts to an application for the municipal equivalent of voluntary 
sequestration, except that assets reasonably necessary to sustain effective 
administration or provide basic municipal services will not be affected. A 
trustee will be appointed to prepare a distribution scheme and settle 
claims against the municipali[y.~7 
H6 Government Gazctle No. 21 <121 of 2H July 2000 P 1 13 ·1 1 <1 
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THE QUEST FOR IQNANCIAL DIScrPLlNE AT LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL 
Section' 5.3 applications for excraordinary relief may only be gramed in 
conjunction with mandaLOry provincial intervemion, if it is likely that the 
approved recovery plan will fail without such an order, and if all the 
municipal assets not reasonably required to sustain effective administra~ 
tion or a minimum level of municipal services have been liquidated in the 
case of an order for the suspension of obligations to creditors. Creditors 
may find this section more equitable as the implementation of the recov~ 
ery plan implies the hope that the municipality may be able to pay its 
debts in future. Alternatively, credilOrs may share in the distribution 
scheme. Slightly worrying, however. is the fact that a stay of proceedings 
in terms of section 153 may be granted for periods of 90 days at a time, 
with no apparent Iimir on how many times this could be repeated. Pre~ 
sum ably, applications can be made as long as a mandatory intervention in 
terms of section 139 is in place, and that could be for an indefinite period 
until "the municipality's ability to meet its financial commitments is 
secured" .~ti As in section 152. creditors owed less than R 1 00 000 need not 
be notified of section 153 applications, but at least organised labour must 
be notified, When measured against the Policy's stated intention of pro~ 
moting municipal creditworthiness and attracring investments, these 
provisions may not inspire enough confidence among potential creditors. 
Finally, section 150 of the MFM Bill, as adopted, stipulates that if the 
conditions for mandatory provincial intervention in terms of section 
139(4) and (5) of the Constitution are met and the provincial executive 
fails to, or does not adequately, exercise these powers or functions, then 
the national executive must act or intervene insread of the provincial 
executive, assuming all the powers allocated to a provincial executive in 
Chapter 13. 
10 CONCLUSION 
The Constitution undeniably established local government as a separate 
and, to some extent, autonomous 5phere of government embodied with 
executive and legislative powers - powers that should be used to establish 
responsible, effective and financially viable local government. 
This has not always happened. The situation is aggravated by the lack 
of coherent legislative regulation of municipal borrowing powers that has 
persisted ever since the birth of local government as a separate sphere of 
government, The legislation to address the problem has been in the 
pipeline since 1997, but as evidenced by the 41 parliamentary comm ittee 
meetings on the Bill," it has been difficult to get the balance between local 
autonomy and national and provincial supervision right. 
This legislative process was aimed at addressing four key issues identi-
fied in the Policy for municipal borrowing and financial emergenCies, 
namely: 
88 S! 48 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
• the lack of coherent legislative regulation of municipal borrowing powers; 
• the stagnation of the muniCipal debt market; 
• a policy shift from national government guarantees to local responsi~ 
bility for debt. resulting in a need for a legal and regulatory framework 
that clarifies the rights and obligations of creditors and borrowers; and 
• the increasing financial difficulties experienced by local governments 
. ~c 
In recen t years. 
Although the first publIShed versions of the MFM Bill did not succeed in 
addressing these issues successful!y, progress has been made. The final 
version of the MFM Bill. In particular Chapter 13, does address these 
issues more directly and more successfully. The emphasis is placed on the 
prevention of muniCipal financial crisis rather than curing it and the MFM 
Bill, as adopted, makes it clear that this is primarily the responsibility of 
the municipal council itself and that national or provincial government will 
not 'bailout' municipalities in crisis. Chapter 13 and the creation of the 
Municipal Financial Recovery Service also attempt to regulate and balance 
(rather precariously at times) the rights and needs of the municipality and 
its creditors during municipal Financial crisis. Chapter 13 follows the 
amended provisions in section 139 of the Constitution closely, but there 
appears to be some anomalies between the Constitution and the 2003 MfM 
Bill, especially with regard to the discretionary provincial intervention. 
A number of uncertainties remain, both within section 139 of the Con~ 
stitulion and Chapter 13 of the MFM Bill as adopted - particularly regard-
ing the implementation of the provincial intervention mechanisms and 
the Functions of the MFRS. The Policy pointed out that current common 
law and legislative redress procedures are not of much use to creditors 
vis~a-vis municipalities.~1 Until there is clarity on the present uncertainties 
in the MFM Bill and the Constitution regarding the grounds for provincial 
intervention, and regarding concepts such as "serious financial problem", 
"default". and "inability to meet financial commitments". "any other 
payment as and when due", "recurring or continuous failure to meet 
financial commitments", which are to justify such interventions,~' the 
rights of creditors will not be properly safeguarded and the redress proce-
dures will still not be of much use to them. 
When initially introducing the MFM Bill to Parliament, Minister Trevor 
Manuel confirmed the government's commitment to the facilitation of a 
municipal borrOWing market. and promised to take steps to ensure that all 
spheres of government act on their constitutional responsibilities, so that 
municipalities will be allowed to lower their costs of borrowing for capital 
expenditure and to attract investors.~} Creditor confidence and municipal 
credit ratings are only likely to improve. however, once these default and 
intervention procedures in both the Constitution and the MFM Bill have 
<)0 Governmenf Gazelle No.2 J 423 of 28 JIJly 2000 P 92. 
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THE QUEST FOR FINANCIAl. OISCIPIJNF. AT I DCAI. GOVERNMENT LEVEl. 
not only been clarified, but also implemented successfully. At the earliest 
this will happen at the start of the 2004-2005 financial year.°4 Until then, 
Financial discipline at local government level and the creation of a viable 
and sustainable municipal debt market remain a dream. 
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